

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

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We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion—intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.

Should issues of gender equality be limited to issues of social justice, or does societal-level discrimination and violence against women have a far more deleterious effect on society in increasing the likelihood of internal conflict?¹ Rather than focusing on the genesis of, or justification for differences between the sexes, the more important question should concentrate on how those differences are used to create a society primed for violence.

Scholars studying intrastate conflict tend to focus on the underlying social conditions leading to domestic conflict (see Gurr, 1970) or on the rational calculation preceding a decision to use violence (see Tilly, 1978). In general, the political science literature on intrastate conflict emphasizes the role of domestic culture in predicting intrastate conflict (Mazrui, 1990; Gurr, 1994; Henderson, 1997; Saide-man, 1997; Ayres, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Fox, 2001). Such studies center on the role of ethnicity in predicting intrastate conflict (Gurr, 1994; Vayrynen, 1994). Although these studies examine aspects of culture, they exclude an examination of the cultural roles assigned to women and the overall impact of gender on intrastate violence. Gender equality might have a dual impact in hindering the ability of

Author's Note: Data for this project can be found at: (<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~isq/data>).

¹ Intrastate conflict, internal conflict, domestic conflict, and domestic violence are used interchangeably. Civil war is used to denote occurrences of intrastate conflict that are characterized by Correlates of War project (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, 2003) criteria for intrastate war as requiring a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths.

groups to mobilize the masses in support of insurrection through the use of gendered language and stereotypes and in reducing societal tolerance for violence.

Studies focusing on the role of gender equality and *interstate* conflict highlight the relationship between international violence and domestic gender equality (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli, 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). In general, countries characterized by gender inequality are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes and more likely to rely on violence to settle those disputes. Consequently, there is reason to believe that gender equality will also have an impact on *intrastate* conflict. This research adds to our knowledge on the causes of intrastate conflict in two ways. First, this project further tests the general theoretical assertions concerning the role of societal-level variables in predicting intrastate conflict. Second, this research systematically tests some of the theoretical expectations found within feminist literature. I suspect that greater levels of gender inequality will help predict the likelihood of domestic conflict thereby helping to identify those states most likely to become embroiled in domestic conflict.

After first providing the relevant theoretical and conceptual arguments regarding intrastate conflict, I provide an analysis of structural violence and its potential role in predicting intrastate violence. Next, I explore the feminist literature illuminating the role of gender inequality and discrimination in nationalist uprisings. I then empirically examine through logistic regression the impact of gender inequality on the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Ultimately, I seek to discover whether domestic gender equality reduces the occurrence of intrastate violence. This project supports a growing body of research in international relations and comparative politics predicting intrastate conflict based on such malignant societal characteristics as domestic inequality and discrimination.

Recognized Causes of Intrastate Conflict

Current research on intrastate conflicts, taken for granted as gender neutral, assumes a male-centric analysis. Two main and complementary lines of scholarly inquiry are associated with the study of intrastate conflict, defined herein as violence within state borders with citizens and their government as antagonists. One aspect in explaining intrastate conflict focuses on grievance, which provides the motivation for a group to use violence “based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is treated, often with a strong historical dimension” (Murshed, 2002:389). This definition is based on Gurr’s (1970) seminal work *Why Men Rebel*, which highlights the complex interaction of inequality, discrimination, and rebellion and the role of relative deprivation in predicting intrastate violence. It is not merely inequality or diversity that spurs intrastate violence but rather systemic discrimination.

In short, intrastate violence is most likely when groups have a sense of common identity with a concomitant in-group/out-group distinction (see Tilly, 1978, 1991; Snyder, 1993; Gurr, 1994), opportunity based on a rational actor model (see Gurr, 1970, 1994; Tilly, 1978, 1991), frustration based on relative deprivation (see Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970), and a history of discrimination (Gurr and Harff, 1994).

A strong sense of group identification increases the likelihood of violence, as conflict and violence are a likely consequence of in-group/out-group distinctions (Snyder, 1993:93), and is necessary to mobilize groups toward collective action (see Gurr, 1970). Collective action is associated with a rational calculation based on the shared advantages and disadvantages of acting collectively as well as opportunity and the likelihood that the group will face further repression as a result of its action (Tilly, 1978). In other words, groups suffering from discrimination must weigh the cost of inaction versus the cost of action. A sense of relative deprivation by a subgroup within society tends to create a sense of shared identity within that group based on their shared grievances and can provide a motive for violence. Relative

deprivation is based on individual perception when expectations for need satisfaction, often based on economics, exceed reality. Put simply, relative deprivation is the result of a person or group not enjoying what they believe they deserve. This frustration breeds aggression (Davies, 1962) and provides the motive for collective action and violence.

The motivation for collective action coupled with group identification is not, however, a sufficient cause of internal conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) make an important contribution to the rational actor/greed model in highlighting the importance of economic factors as a predictor of civil war by focusing on the critical importance of a group's ability to finance rebellion (see also Hegre, 2003).

A continuum of intrastate violence exists from low levels of violence between the government and some of its citizens to full-scale civil war. The escalation from domestic violence to civil war with high casualties and of a long duration may be based on a rational calculation. A motivation based on grievance/relative deprivation, however, is a necessary component of provoking domestic violence. In sum, intrastate violence is more likely when people have a motive (grievance) based on relative deprivation which in turn fosters a sense of group identity. The likelihood of full-scale civil war increases when the resultant group has both the economic means (greed) to act and the opportunity to act based on a rational calculation of a state's potential response based on the likelihood of greater repression or of facilitation.

Thus far the literature on intrastate conflict excludes an examination of gender from the calculus. We cannot assume, however, that gender has no impact in predicting intrastate violence. Indeed, gender plays an unrecognized role in the current literature on intrastate conflict. This literature is based on masculine stereotypes of competition, violence, and territoriality (see Miller, 1988; White, 1988; Welch and Hibbing, 1992; Gidengil, 1995) in which grievance by default leads not to a negotiated settlement based on identified commonalities, but rather to competition and violence. The political world, however, cannot be completely understood when based on stereotypical masculine characteristics (see Tickner, 1992, 2001). Why would grievance lead to violence? And what accounts for the varying tolerance for violence within societies? Certainly, grievance does not always lead to violence. We need to examine the underlying cultural norms that legitimize violence and facilitate a call to arms. Intrastate conflict is more likely in those societies whose cultural norms support violence as a legitimate means toward addressing grievances. Such conditions are inherent to structural inequality, leading to structural violence.

The Role of Gender and Structural Violence in Intrastate Violence

Both structural violence (Galtung, 1975) and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) are keys to understanding societal levels of violence because they create the fundamental justification for violence. The importance of state- and societal-level factors, including regime type, on the likelihood of war is supported by three decades of research (see Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 1996). According to the democratic peace thesis as well as research by anthropologists in some two-dozen "peaceful societies," states apply the same domestic norms and behaviors in both domestic and international settings (Bonta, 1996; Maoz, 2003). This proclivity toward international peace in certain societies is based, in part, "on tolerance and a respect for the rights of opponents" (Raymond, 2000:290). If norms of tolerance and respect have a pacifying impact on domestic and international behavior, then norms of intolerance and inequality should have an incendiary impact on domestic and international behavior by legitimizing violence as a tool of conflict resolution.

According to Galtung (1975), structural violence is understood as systematic exploitation that becomes part of the social order. This systematic exploitation renders personal violence unnecessary—"Personal violence is only for the amateur in dominance; structural violence is the tool of the professional. The amateur who wants to dominate uses guns, the professional uses social structure" (Galtung, 1975:80).

Although Galtung focused on structural violence in terms of economic inequality, his theory can readily be applied to other forms of structural violence. Structural violence has four basic components: exploitation which is focused on the division of labor with the benefits being asymmetrically distributed, penetration which necessitates the control by the exploiters over the consciousness of the exploited thus resulting in the acquiescence of the oppressed, fragmentation which means that the exploited are separated from each other, and marginalization with the exploiters as a privileged class with their own rules and form of interaction (Galtung, 1975: 264-65).

In applying Galtung's (1975:265) model of structural violence to women, we find all four components of structural violence. In terms of exploitation, gender roles and expectations lead "to highly differential possibilities for personal development." The second component, penetration, is closely related to exploitation "by providing a structure that produces extreme differentials in development of consciousness." Structural violence is maintained through socialization, gender stereotyping, and a constant threat of violence (see Bunch and Carrillo, 1998), all of which insidiously identify women as inferior. Third, fragmentation results from women having fewer job opportunities outside the home that would allow for participation and create a sense of efficacy (Pateman, 1970). Fragmentation also results from women having greater family responsibilities, thus minimizing leisure time that could otherwise be used to socialize, meet with other women, or to become politically active. And finally, "marginalization is the clear separation line between the two [in this case men and women], leaving no doubt as to who are first class and who are second class" (Galtung, 1975:265). Indeed, gendered hierarchies are indicative of "a set of social practices, beliefs, ideas, values and speech that promote male domination and superiority and female subordination and 'secondariness' (Rowbotham 1983:27)" (Sideris, 2001:143).

Structural violence is created and sustained by cultural norms. In other words, structural violence is a process by which cultural violence is institutionalized. Indeed, Galtung (1990) highlights the role of cultural violence as part of the social matrix of violence that is used to both justify and legitimize structural violence. Norms of cultural violence can be found in religion, ideology, language, and art, among other aspects of culture. "Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right—or at least not wrong" (Galtung, 1990:291).

Although women have become active agents with notable success in the struggle for equality, violence remains a component of relations between men and women (Sideris, 2001)—an enduring aspect of cultural violence that underscores gendered structural violence. Multiple causes of violence against women exist, yet inequality of power (domination and subordination) is a common denominator in all acts of violence. It is this structural inequality of power that "creates the conditions for the social control of women" (Sideris, 2001:142).

Gender is an integral aspect of structural and cultural violence, for gender forms the basis of structural inequality² in all states. Although the power and role of women vary across states, women have yet to gain full equality in any state. Gender is a multifaceted aspect of discrimination with issues of gender determining roles,

² Of course structural hierarchies may also be based on race, religion, etc.—an analysis that is beyond the scope of this study. Gender is, however, a cross-cultural foundation of structural inequality.

power relationships, responsibilities, expectations, and access to resources (UNPFA, 2003).

Gender, as an analytical category, captures the complex matrix of social relationships within society (Rosaldo, 1980; UNPFA, 2003). Although a hierarchy among women exists, gender stratification subsists across class and socioeconomic status. A gender hierarchy is established that “reinforces itself through an elaborate system of rules and punishments enforced in all aspects of life” (Grant, 1993:161). Although gender roles change over time and are culturally dependent, gender is used as a benchmark to determine access and power, and is the rubric under which inequality is justified and maintained. Indeed, “Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena” (Cockburn, 2001:15). This interaction includes economic, political, and social dynamics. The intrusion of gender inequality throughout all aspects of human interaction thus creates the foundation for structural inequality.

Structural inequality is based on subjugation and inequality (see Dietz, 1985) that is rooted in hierarchy, domination, and the use of force (Brock-Utne, 1990). The structural system of male domination is sustained through the persistence of gender stereotypes (Humm, 1990), which are themselves socially endowed labels (see Millett, 1970). Maintaining power under a system of structural inequality requires the acquiescence of the oppressed (Millett, 1970; Gaventa, 1980). Socialization, gender stereotyping, and a constant threat of violence assure acquiescence to structural inequality (see Bunch and Carrillo, 1998). When structural violence is minimized, societal tolerance of violence is decreased (see Caprioli, 2003), thus leading to fewer international disputes and potentially to fewer instances of intrastate violence as argued herein. Conversely, when societal tolerance of violence is supported and legitimized by an environment of structural violence, the incidence of both inter- and intrastate violence should increase, for violence becomes a way of life and a valid tool for settling disputes.

These malignant norms of domination and subordination become enshrined in structural violence, which thrives on social conditions of exploitation, domination, repression, and discrimination (see Ibeanu, 2001) and sustains a world view that is competitive rather than cooperative (see Schwartz, 1996). Inequality, when extreme and systematic, leads to political violence (Midlarsky, 1999). In other words, norms of equality facilitate cooperation among groups who are then more likely to rely on influence or persuasion, rather than on violence (Ross, 2000). Norms of inequality—cultural violence—create intransigence.

The link between inequality and violence and more specifically between gendered inequality and violence leads UNESCO (1995) to conclude that inequality between men and women is an impediment to sustainable peace. In other words, achieving peace necessitates “overcoming social relations of domination and subordination” (Tickner, 1992:128). The impact of gender inequality on intrastate violence should not be underestimated. Just as domestic norms of peaceful conflict resolution and of gender inequality predict state behavior internationally, so too should gender inequality help predict intrastate violence. Gendered structural hierarchies, which are maintained by norms of violence and oppression, should result in higher levels of intrastate violence by inuring people to violence and by providing the framework for justifying violence. Gendered hierarchies have an additional role in explaining ethnic insurgencies, which comprise a subset of intrastate conflicts.

Gendered Nationalism—An Appeal for Domestic Violence

Given the ethnic dimension to many internal conflicts, it is important to explore the gendered dimension of nationalism to more fully understand the role of gender in intrastate conflict. As with the broader study of intrastate conflict, political science

literature analyzing the role of nationalism in intrastate conflict excludes a gender analysis. Yet a number of feminist studies have identified gender as a theoretically important aspect in the calculus for understanding intrastate conflict. Indeed, feminist literature focusing on the role of women in domestic conflict has identified gender inequality as a justification for violence and insurrection. Yet this literature has been largely ignored. In particular, international relations and comparative politics scholars studying the role of nationalism in intrastate violence focus on ethnic and nationalist appeals for violence (see Ellingsen, 2000). These ethnic and nationalist appeals for violence depend on gender inequality and structural violence as a legitimization of violence by relying on gendered language and gender stereotypes to mobilize the masses.

There is an inherent nationalist antipathy toward feminist goals, for men are considered the guardians of culture and tradition and any reforms to the cultural distribution of power are viewed as a threat to nationalist efforts to protect or unify the community (Tickner, 1992, 2001; Papanek, 1994; Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Indeed, the dichotomy between men and women that underscores structural inequality and violence is also an integral aspect of nationalism. "Throughout the period of state building in the West, nationalist movements have used gendered imagery that exhorts masculine heroes to fight for the establishment and defense of the mother country" (Tickner, 2001:43). This gendered perception of unity and strength is recreated in the actions of female leaders who avoid gender-related issues so as not to undermine national or communal solidarity (Jayawardena, 1986; Hawkesworth, 1990; Peteet, 1991). Both male and female leaders encourage women to support the collective goals of the nation even when those collective goals are contrary to goals of gender equality (Mostov, 2000).

Literature on nationalism and domestic conflict focuses on how minority groups, particularly ethnic groups, become targets in nationalist calls to violence. Women, however, also constitute a minority group in terms of power, yet are largely excluded from systematic studies on intrastate conflict. Because minority groups are often targeted as a means to nationalist mobilization (Snyder, 1993), women suffer the same ethnic discrimination as their male counterparts in addition to being targeted by their own ethnic group under gendered nationalism as discussed below. The effectiveness of this nationalist rhetoric, however, is limited in societies that are more open and pluralistic in which structural and cultural violence is minimized. Although not specifically included in the literature, pluralism might also refer to equality between the sexes. Just as societies possessing norms and institutions that offer ethnic minorities assimilation into the body of the nation, political equality, and cultural autonomy are less likely to experience violence (Snyder, 1993), so too should societies that provide gender equality. Once again, a gendered analysis would predict that societies possessing norms of gender and structural equality, rather than inequality and structural violence, should be less likely to experience violence based on a cultural intolerance of violence.

Indeed, the prior existence of equality hampers the ability to mobilize through demoralizing women. A shift in discourse centering on dichotomies of "us versus them" serves as a precursor to intrastate violence. This discourse serves to unite in-group members by drawing a clear distinction between the in-group and all others. More importantly, the changing discourse intertwines a discussion of gender with that of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997). "This divisive discourse is often accompanied by a renewal of a patriarchal familial ideology, deepening the differentiation of men and women, masculinity and femininity" (Cockburn, 2001:19).

Clearly nationalism is not gender neutral. The category "woman" becomes a tool of leaders in a call to arms, and women are forced into traditional roles as wives, mothers, and nurturers. Dichotomizing the sexes becomes one of many ways of creating in- and out-groups both within and between groups. "Gender relations are a crucial, not peripheral, dimension of the dynamics of group identities and

intergroup conflicts" (Peterson, 1998:42–43). Conscious decisions of power, in which the role of women is one part, are used "to develop ethnic consciousness, to politicize it, to transform it into nationalism" (Enloe, 1998:52) and to justify violence.

Gendered nationalism strictly defines women's roles: First, women are defined as child-bearers in juxtaposition to men as soldiers, thus legitimizing men's control over reproduction (Peterson, 1998). Second, the category "woman" and its cultural definition become a reification of the culture and a symbol of group differences, thus maintaining and intensifying a sense of ethnic belonging (Pettman, 1992; Peterson, 1998). Indeed the role of women as caretakers, and that of men as soldiers, is a foundation of patriarchal militarism (see Kaplan, 1994). "Militarization of ethnic nationalism often depends on persuading individual men that their own manhood will be fully validated only if they perform as soldiers, either in the state's military or in insurgent autonomous or quasi-autonomous forces" (Enloe, 1989:55). Third, gendered violence is used to maintain men's control over women's productive and reproductive labor (Carrillo, 1991; Turshen, 2001). Gendered nationalism, therefore, relies on dichotomous gender roles, thus bolstering structural inequality and violence.

Both structural violence and gendered nationalism lead to the expectation that women's domestic equality would result in fewer incidences of domestic conflict. The absence of domestic oppression and violence associated with gendered hierarchies that fuel militant nationalism should lead to lower societal violence overall. This leads to the broader expectation that the inclusion of women as equal members of society should result in a change in overall societal values that affect state policies both internationally, as has been the subject of several studies (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli, 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001), and domestically, as will be tested in this project.

Gender inequality should have a substantial impact on intrastate conflict based on the direct impact of structural inequality with its inherent norms of discrimination and violence and the role that structural inequality has in facilitating ethnic rebellion. Moreover, gender discrimination and structural violence are important aspects in mobilizing groups and in legitimizing violence. Based on the previous discussion, the expected relationship between domestic norms of gender inequality and intrastate conflict can be stated as follows: The higher the level of gender inequality, the greater the likelihood that a state will experience intrastate conflict.

Research Design and Methodology

Beyond theoretical inquiry, this project uses statistical analysis to test the above hypothesis, which will be analyzed using a cross-national, longitudinal study of intrastate conflict, coding for gender equality while controlling for other variables known to predict intrastate conflict. The unit of analysis is the country-year in order to predict the likelihood of a state experiencing intrastate conflict based on measures of gender inequality.

The models test,³ using logistic regression, the impact of gender inequality on the likelihood of the state being involved in intrastate disputes (see Table 1). The quantitative analysis spans the 1960–2001 time period, which is limited by the availability of data used in the analysis. Given this limited temporal domain, caution about the generalizability of any findings is warranted. The base data set was created using EUGene (Bennett and Stam, 2000) to generate a list of all country-years from 1960 to 1997 manually updated to 2001. Added to the analysis are controls for other possible influences on domestic conflict including transitional polities, polity type, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, GDP per capita growth rate, prior

³ STATA is used to run the statistical analyses.

TABLE 1. The Impact of Gender Equality on the Likelihood of a State Experiencing PRIO/Uppsala Coded Internal Conflict, 1960–2001

<i>Models*</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>
<i>Internal conflict</i>	<i>Fertility Rate</i>	<i>Female Labor Force Participation</i>
Gender equality	0.602 [†] (0.288)	– 0.027 [†] (0.014)
At-risk minorities	1.109 [†] (0.460)	0.997 [†] (0.487)
# of at-risk minorities	0.164 [†] (0.059)	0.168 [†] (0.05)
Transitional polities	0.790 [†] (0.182)	0.836 [†] (0.186)
Polity type	0.076 (0.125)	0.058 (0.126)
GDP per capita growth	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
GDP per capita	– 0.000 [†] (0.000)	– 0.000 [†] (0.000)
Prior intrastate conflict	1.404 [†] (0.271)	1.488 [†] (0.275)
Constant	– 3.187 [†] (0.566)	– 1.678 [†] (0.711)
Peace years	– 1.528 [†] (0.111)	– 1.547 [†] (0.112)
Spline(1) [‡]	– 0.053 [†] (0.005)	– 0.054 [†] (0.005)
Spline(2) [‡]	0.014 [†] (0.002)	0.015 [†] (0.002)
Spline(3) [‡]	– 0.001 [†] (0.000)	– 0.002 [†] (0.000)
Model significance	$p < .0001$	$p < .0001$
Log likelihood	– 721.333	– 709.9
N	4122	4076

*STATA was used to run the logistic regression. The table includes parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

[†]Meets or exceeds the $p < .05$ standard of statistical significance.

[‡]Coefficients of Peace Years cubic spline segments.

GDP, gross domestic product.

domestic conflict, peace years, and the existence of and number of at-risk minorities. All of the variables appearing in the analysis are described in detail below.

Dependent Variable

Internal conflict is defined as conflict confined within a recognized state boundary between the government and one or more groups within the state.

(a) *Internal Conflict*—defined using the PRIO/Uppsala data set (Strand, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch, 2003:8) criteria for internal conflict. The threshold for coding internal conflict begins at a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year. The PRIO/Uppsala variable is transformed into a dichotomous measure with “0” representing no internal conflict and “1” representing internal conflict.

Although a higher threshold of violence of 1,000 related battle deaths is often used in studying interstate war, the rationale for such a high threshold of violence is hard to defend when studying intrastate conflict. The 1,000 death threshold is considered necessary by those who study war initiation, in which an “attack in strength” criterion is used to control for the actions of rogue units or small-scale

patrols operating outside central authority (Small and Singer, 1982). In intrastate conflict, an attack in strength criterion is irrelevant, because one of the actors is a civilian group and the other, a government that has limited central authority in transitional polities (those that are neither defined as democratic nor autocratic). A 25-death threshold becomes more meaningful for intrastate conflict as such a death rate is highly disruptive to society.

Independent Variables Measuring Gender Equality

The objective in measuring gendered structural violence is capturing the complex matrix of gender discrimination and inequality that includes political, economic, and social discrimination. Two measures of gender equality are used—fertility rate and percent women in the labor force.

(a) *Fertility Rate*—The World Bank (2003) provides a continuous measure for fertility rate. The choice of measuring gender equality using fertility rate has precedent as both a continuous and dichotomized measure of women's equality while controlling for economic measures, in the limited cross-cultural quantitative literature that includes gender variables (see Caprioli, 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003).

Fertility rate captures multiple aspects of the complex matrix of discrimination and inequality. Basically, high fertility rates are not only a result of gender discrimination but also have a negative impact on women's health and are related to lower levels of education, employment, and decision-making authority in both the family and the community (Blumberg, 1989; Dasgupta, 1995; UN, 1995; UNDP, 1995). Furthermore, the expectation of women as biological and social reproducers, particularly as emphasized in gendered nationalism, also serves to lower occupational aspirations (Huber, 1991). Lower aspirations coupled with structural and cultural violence allow for fewer opportunities, thus explaining the link between economic power and fertility (Blumberg, 1991). Fertility rate is thus a direct measure of gender equality and a proxy measure for education, employment, and social standing.

Fertility rate is categorized with 0 representing fertility rates from 0 to 3.00, and with 1 representing fertility rates of 3.01 and higher. Thus, a score of "1" represents gender inequality. Fertility rate is categorized in order to reduce the number of missing variables. For instance, a state with a fertility rate of 6.5 in 1985 and a fertility rate of 6 in 1988 can be coded with a high degree of confidence as a 1 (fertility rate of 3.01 or higher) for 1986 and 1987. Only obvious cases are recoded.

A fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary to ensure population replacement with the global fertility rate average currently at 2.7 (UNICEF, 2003). The variable for fertility rate is dichotomized in order to estimate data points for missing years. Considering the current global fertility rate average and the necessary fertility rate to ensure population replacement, the cutoff point for the dichotomous fertility rate variable is set at 3, which represents a conservative measure allowing for a certain amount of personal choice and need, in addition to discrimination, all of which factor into fertility rate. Thus, choice and need must be balanced with the strong correlation between fertility rate and women's health, level of education, and employment.

(b) *Percent Women in the Labor Force*—The World Bank (2003) provides a continuous measure for women's share of the adult labor force. Women in the work force gain a sense of empowerment, which often leads to greater autonomy and independence and participation in the political arena (see Caprioli, 2000). An elevation in economic standing brings greater status and access to political and economic systems (UN, 1984). Formal access to the political and economic spheres results in power and opportunities that in turn enable a person to choose a way of life. Life choices provide a social value for women beyond marriage and mother-

hood (UN, 1984). A woman who can exercise control over reproductive choices, including the number of children she chooses to bear, is more likely to participate in the labor force than women who have little control over their reproduction (Dixon-Mueller, 1993). In short, participation in the work force leads to greater gender equality by improving livelihoods and increasing women's self-esteem, social status within society and the family, and their decision-making power (Blumberg, 1984; Sadik, 1997).

Control Variables

Several control variables are incorporated into the model: presence of at-risk minorities, the number of at-risk minority groups, transitional polities, polity type, average GDP per capita growth rate, GDP per capita, and prior domestic conflict.

(a) *Polity Type*—This variable is created from the Polity2 variable in the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000) and ranges from -1 to 1 with 1 representing democracies with polity scores of 6 through 10, -1 representing autocracies with polity scores of -6 through -10, and 0 representing transitional polities with polity scores of -5 through 5.

Polity type is included as a control variable for the possible confounding effects of democracy and gender equality;⁴ for democracy which decreases the likelihood of civil war (Ellingsen, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002); for structural violence and gendered nationalism because less democratic regimes are based "on gendered foundations, relying particularly on the construction of masculinity and femininity which assigns particular "traditional" roles to women" (Waylen, 1996:114); for the possible confounding effects of regime type and discrimination, equality, and repression.

(b) *Transitional Polities*—This is a binary variable calculated from the polity-type variable, for transitional polities are more likely to experience domestic conflict than other regime types (Muller and Weede, 1990; Gurr, 1994; Hegre et al., 2001). 1 represents transitional regimes, and 0 represents all other regime types. The transitional polities variable offers a dual control for liberal as well as repressive regimes. In other words, excessive repression in autocracies might diminish the opportunity for domestic insurgency, but liberal regimes provide little motivation to act (Auvinen, 1997).

(c) *GDP per Capita (Constant Dollars, 1995 U.S.\$)*—The World Bank (2003) provides data on GDP per capita. At the most basic level, GDP per capita predicts intrastate conflict—as income increases conflict decreases (Ellingsen, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2002). Controlling for GDP per capita helps isolate measures of gender equality and the norms of inequality from economic issues. This variable is included in the model for several additional reasons: economic development reduces deprivation (Weede, 1981), which is linked to domestic conflict; low per capita income serves as an indication of state failure, which in turn can lead to a strengthening of kinship ties (Azam, 2001) and a strong sense of group identity both of which can lead to ethnic conflict as discussed above; wealth is sometimes thought to be a precursor to equality (see Inglehart, 1990) and elements of discrimination and inequality may also be linked with resource scarcity (Choucri and North, 1989; Midlarsky, 1999); GDP per capita serves as a proxy measure of opportunity costs (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Opportunity is related to means, which is partly a factor of state strength. GDP per capita serves as a measure of state strength and therefore, a measure of opportunity

⁴ Pearson's correlation coefficient for democracy and fertility rate is -0.458 , $p < .0001$ and $.023$ for percent women in the labor force.

costs—the stronger the state is economically, the higher the costs of insurrection. In other words, strong states should experience less domestic conflict.

(d) *Average GDP per Capita Growth Rate*—Economic growth rate is measured as a 5-year average ($t - 1$) using GDP per capita in 1995 constant U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2003). This variable serves as a control for recession, which increases domestic conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Blomberg and Hess, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2002). This variable controls for many of the same issues as does GDP per capita: a negative growth rate might increase competition for goods, thus increasing discrimination and inequality; and low or negative per capita income growth rates serve as an additional indication of state strength and, therefore, a measure of opportunity costs (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).

(e) *Prior Domestic Conflict*—This binary variable indicates whether or not the state experienced domestic conflict in the past decade with “0” representing no domestic conflict in the preceding decade and “1” representing domestic conflict in the preceding decade. This variable is calculated back to 1950 in order to calculate the data points starting in 1960. Previous domestic conflict increases the likelihood of future conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) and also controls for ongoing disputes—spells of conflict that introduce temporal dependence.

(f) *Minorities at Risk (MAR)*—This variable is generated by MARGene (Gurr, 1997a,b). MAR (Gurr, 1993) are ethnopolitical groups that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discrimination relative to other domestic groups and/or that collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests. The MAR project tracks the political, economic, and cultural status and characteristics of more than 280 politically active ethnic groups. Ethnic discrimination is a measure of ethnic dominance, which unlike diversity, is associated with intrastate conflict (Bates, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).

Underscoring the complex interrelationship between societal conditions and intrastate conflict and measuring grievance in part as either the number of ethnic groups or the percent of the population comprised by the largest ethnic group, Ellingsen (2000) finds the relation between intrastate conflict and the number of ethnic groups within a state to be an inverted U-shaped curve. This is consistent with Collier and Hoeffler’s (2002) finding that more diverse societies decrease civil war, thus underscoring the need to measure discrimination not merely diversity.

Two measures of MAR will be used—the first is a binary measure with “0” representing the absence of any at-risk minority in the state, and with “1” indicating the existence of one or more at-risk minorities. The second measure will indicate the actual number of at-risk minorities within each state. Although the number of groups within society (Ellingsen, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) is not linearly related to domestic conflict, it is unclear what the relation between the existence and number of at-risk minority groups and intrastate conflict is. There is a clear distinction between the existence of various ethnopolitical groups and the existence of ethnopolitical groups that have a strong sense of group identity reinforced in part, by collective discrimination as discussed above.

(g) *Peace years*—A control for duration dependence—spells of peace (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998). This variable captures a different aspect of temporal dependence than the prior domestic conflict variable. Although the two variables are correlated (-0.508), the inclusion of both variables in the model does not introduce multicollinearity.

Results

The hypothesis is confirmed. Gender inequality, as measured by both fertility rate and female percent of labor force, increases the likelihood that a state will experience internal conflict. The higher the level of gender inequality within a state, the greater the likelihood such a state will experience internal conflict. In short, states

characterized by gender discrimination and structural hierarchy are permeated with norms of violence that make internal conflict more likely.

The statistical analyses use cross-sectional time series panel data. Two analyses are run—one with fertility rate, and the other with percent women in the labor force. A logistic regression random effects model is warranted by the significance of the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). As a further control for my model using binary time series cross-sectional data, I employ the corrections specified by Beck et al. (1998). The methods I use correct for temporal dependence inherent to cross-sectional time series data (see Beck and Katz, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). A likelihood ratio test of the model without the temporal controls and the one including the temporal controls indicates strong duration dependence,⁵ thus warranting the inclusion of the temporal controls. I also conclude that multicollinearity is not affecting the models. The model that includes fertility rate has a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.54, and the model with percent women in the labor force has a mean VIF of 1.40 (Menard, 2002; Mertler and Vannatta, 2001; Gujarati, 2003).

Fertility rate shows statistical significance—states with high fertility rates (3.01 and higher) are nearly twice (1.83) as likely to experience internal conflict than those states with low fertility rates (3 and below), while controlling for other possible causes of internal conflict. Percent women in the labor force is also statistically significant—states with 10 percent women in the labor force are nearly 30 times (29.1) more likely to experience internal conflict than are states with 40 percent women in the labor force, while controlling for other possible causes of internal conflict.

These results for gender equality⁶ are consistent with theoretical expectations—higher levels of gender inequality increase the likelihood of domestic conflict. States characterized by gender inequality, rooted in hierarchy, discrimination, and violence, necessarily support norms of violence. As such, states with gender inequality are primed for violence. Furthermore, rebellion also seems to gain momentum from gender-defined roles and on a norm of violence inherent to gendered structural hierarchies.

Control Variables

The presence of at-risk minorities, the number of at-risk minority groups, transitional polities, polity type, average GDP per capita growth rate, GDP per capita, peace years, and prior domestic conflict serve as control variables in the models. The control variables have similar substantive and statistical significance in both models. Both the presence of at-risk minorities and the number of at-risk minorities increase the likelihood of internal conflict. The presence of at-risk minorities increases the likelihood of internal conflict by two-and-a-half. Each additional at-risk minority group increases the chance of internal conflict by 17 percent. These results support the grievance theory of domestic conflict as discussed above.

The insignificance of the polity-type variable and the significance of the transitional polity variable are consistent with previous studies. The relation between polity type and internal conflict is described as an inverted U-shaped curve. When controlling for transitional polities, democracies are no more likely to experience internal conflict than are autocracies. In keeping with other studies, transitional polities, defined as those that are neither democratic nor autocratic, are more likely to experience internal conflict with transitional polities twice as likely to experience internal conflict than other polity types.

⁵ LR $\chi^2(4) = 347.32$. The probability of obtaining this result by chance is zero.

⁶ As an interesting note, preliminary tests using the difference in male and female literacy rates as a measure of gender equality reveal similar results. The results are not reported herein as there are too many missing data points, which exclude a number of states from the analysis.

This result seems to lend support to the theoretical argument that repressive regimes do not provide the opportunity for groups to take action against the state, and democracies reduce the motivation for insurgency. Democratic states are constrained by the rule of law limiting their ability to strike back at insurgents thus lowering the risk/cost for the group and potentially increasing the likelihood of violence. Plus, the insurgents benefit from living in an open society in providing greater opportunities to meet, organize, plan an attack, and obtain weapons (see Sederberg, 1989; Combs, 2003). It is important to note that democracy scores only measure specific procedural aspects of democracy rather than the actual experience of citizens, thus they do not measure access or cultural discrimination.

The significance of prior conflict supports the results of previous studies as detailed in the variable section. States that experienced internal conflict within the prior decade were four times more likely to experience internal conflict. This is not surprising as many internal conflicts last more than 1 year.

Examining issues of discrimination and inequality is inherently tied to issues of wealth, as GDP per capita is found to be a significant predictor of civil war (Elingsen, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2002). Higher income per capita raises education levels and improves public health (Sambanis, 2002). Indeed Collier and Hoeffler (2002:22) note the similar statistical results for GDP per capita and male secondary school enrollment as alternate variables in two separate models and point out that the two measures might not necessarily proxy opportunity costs as much as other effects of income and education. I include measures of wealth and of gender inequality in the same model and find both income and gender inequality significant predictors of internal conflict. The lower the per capita income is, the greater the likelihood of internal conflict.

Other effects of income and education include greater gender equality. States with low per capita income might be more prone to internal conflict, with gender inequality (measured by fertility rates and percent women in the labor force) and their concomitant societal norms of cultural violence helping to explain the link between per capita income and civil war. Gender discrimination, including the interrelationship among a lack of paid labor and low social standing, "combined with the usefulness of children for labor in subsistence conditions . . . leads to high fertility rates" (Dasgupta, 1995:40–42), thus relegating women to the role of child bearers and fostering the dichotomy between masculine and feminine roles that contributes to cultural and structural violence. Simply put, the link between per capita income and domestic conflict, considering the literature and theories presented above, might very well be partly explained by domestic norms of equality. It is irrelevant whether the need for children in low subsistence conditions lowers women's status to baby producers, for in the end societal values based on structural violence and inequality remain the same. It is equally possible that the exclusion of women from the political and economic spheres perpetuates these low subsistence conditions.

The insignificance of average per capita income growth rates while controlling for gender equality is interesting and contrary to other studies. This potential measure of opportunity may not be as important in predicting internal conflict with its lower threshold of deaths than it is for predicting civil war with its 1,000 death threshold. In other words, opportunity might be more of a factor in predicting large-scale civil war rather than internal conflict.

Implications

Measures of gender equality help predict intrastate conflict while controlling for economic factors. Gender inequality has negative repercussions at the societal level that go beyond the negative impact on women. It is important to recall that fertility

rates and percent women in the labor force capture the complex social matrix of gender inequality, discrimination, and structural violence. Although fertility rates should be lowered through policies supporting education on family planning, fertility rates must be recognized as a symptom of a much larger cancer. Beyond lowering fertility rate is the need to raise women's social status and recognize the role gender inequality plays in violence at the individual, societal, and state levels. Women must also have the freedom and status to participate in the formal economic sector. In short, what the world needs now is new values and new policies.

Policies aimed at lowering fertility rates will increase women's health and should provide women with more time to participate in paid labor, which in turn results in a sense of empowerment, which increases individual political efficacy, thus fostering political participation (Pateman, 1970). When women become active participants in their own societies, they acquire a sense of efficacy, "which ensures their continual and broadening participation in multiple spheres of their lives" (Caprioli, 2000:58). Education and job training, for both men and women, is of utmost importance as is family planning and the distribution of birth control to those unable to afford it.

It is not merely diversity that spurs intrastate violence but rather systemic discrimination and inequality, thus explaining Collier and Hoeffler's (2002:1) conclusion, based in part on the number of ethnic groups and the numerical population dominance of the largest ethnic group, that "[N]either inequality nor political oppression increase the risk of civil war." When variables that measure inequality rather than mere diversity, such as the number and presence of MAR, are included, we are led to the opposite conclusion that inequality does indeed increase the risk of internal conflict. Furthermore, the insignificance of average GDP per capita growth rate suggests that poverty or growth rates whether negative or positive are not in themselves a predictor of internal conflict without gendered structural violence supporting norms of violence and without the motivation for insurgency provided by discrimination and inequality as indicated by the high significance of the MAR variables and the wealth of literature on rebellion. This economic-equality dynamic deserves further consideration, as this project addresses the unique role of gender inequality in predicting intrastate violence.

Admittedly, achieving greater levels of social, economic, and political gender equality are easier to acknowledge than to accomplish and are interrelated—they must all be addressed simultaneously. For instance, economic growth will not necessarily achieve gender equality without education and opportunities for women. Many people, both men and women, suffer from discrimination, which the international arena has yet to address effectively. There is, however, no justification for not attempting to identify, monitor, support, and defend women's rights. In part, human rights are viewed as issues of social justice, thus minimizing their importance. The implications of gender inequality and other types of inequality, however, are far more dire.

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